В кн. также: Современный опыт теодицеи и антроподицеи / В. Шубин.

戦前にも存在した!席を譲らない若者、車内で化粧をする女性、子どもや老いた親を虐待する人たち。道徳心の欠如について歴史的視点からその本質に迫り、今日起きている様々な社会問題について考える。戦前の日本人の 道徳はいかなる状態だったのか、あまり知られていない歴史の側面を当時の新聞や書籍、統計データなどの資料をひもときながら紹介した。.

熊本大学生命倫理論集第3巻のテーマは「生命の価値」そのものである。生命倫理が前提とする生命という価値についての根本的問いかけに、哲学、倫理学、法学、医学、脳科学、生物学等の様々な分野の専門家が本気で取 り組み、学問の境界を越えた議論を展開する。.

「順序よく漏れなく」、「人が関わるあらゆる事柄の基本的な筋道について、言葉による地図を作成すること」。松永澄夫の哲学。.

殺生に関し、人とそれ以外の生物を区別することをどう考えたらいいのか。区別すべきでないとする思想を検証し、異なる道を示す。.

1. Tan'gun sinhwa ŭi wŏnhyŏngjŏk segyegwan kwa p'ungnyu chŏngsin -- 2. Wŏnhyo ŭi hwajaeng sasang kwa muaehaeng ŭi silch'ŏn -- 3. Ŭisang ŭi 'Hwaŏm ilsŭng pŏpkyedo' e nat'anan Hwaŏm sasang -- 4. Chinul ŭi Tono chŏmsu wa Chŏnghye ssangsu sasang -- 5. Sambong Chŏng To-jŏn ŭi Pulgyo paech'ŏk ŭi naeyong kwa sŏngkyŏk -- 6. T'oegye Yi Hwang ŭi ch'ŏrhakchŏk ipchang kwa 'Kyŏng' sasang -- 7. Kobong Ki Tae-sŭng ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 8. Ugye Sŏng Hon ŭi Tohakchŏk (...) sam kwa hangmun yŏnwŏn -- 9. Yulgok Yi I ŭi Taedong sahoeron kwa ch'ŏrhakchŏk chihyang -- 10. Sŏgye Pak Se-dang ŭi Sirhakchŏk sayu ŭi kich'o -- 11. Namdang Han Wŏn-jin ŭi yŏksa insik kwa Chosŏn chunghwajuŭi -- 12. Sŏngdam Song Hwan-gi ŭi 'T'aegŭk tosŏl' haesŏk ŭi kibon ipchang -- 13. Kanjŏng Yi Nŭng-hwa 'Chosŏn Togyosa' ŭi haksulsachŏk ŭiŭi wa han'gye -- 14. Manhae Han Yong-un i pon chuch'e ŭi munje wa minjok chagyŏl ŭi wŏnch'ik -- purok. T'algyŏnggye sidae ŭi Han'guk ch'ŏrhak ŭi inmunhakchŏk ŭiŭi wa chŏnmang: Yulgok ŭi ch'ŏrhak. (shrink)

1. Tŭrŏ kanŭn kŭl -- 2. Chungguk ŭi Pulgyo suyong : Yu, Pul kan ŭi kyosŏp kwa taerip -- 3. Koryŏ mal Yu, Pul taerip ŭi paegyŏng kwa ch'ui -- 4. Chosŏn ch'ogi paebul sasang kwa Pulgyo ŭi taeŭng -- 5. Yŏmal sŏnch'o Yu, Pul ch'ŏrhak nonjaeng ŭi t'ŭkching kwa ŭiŭi -- 6. Naganŭn kŭl.

Šiame straipsnyje, remiantis 2019–2022 metais atliktu empiriniu tyrimu Kazachstane, analizuojamas vienas negatyvios formalios socialinės kontrolės instrumentų – nepa­geidautiną individų ir socialinių grupių elgesį viešosiose erdvėse draudžiantys ženklai. Tyrime taikyta etnografijos ir vizualios sociologijos metodologinės prieigos: stebėji­ mas nedalyvaujant ir viešųjų erdvių bei jose esančių draudžiamųjų ženklų fiksavimas pasitelkiant fotografavimą. Straipsnyje pristatomi ir analizuojami vizualūs duome­nys – fotografijos. Ši analizė papildoma stebėjimo nedalyvaujant įžvalgomis. Teigiama, kad kasdienį gyvenimą viešosiose erdvėse reglamentuojančių mikrolygmens formalių taisyklių gausa rodo patriarchalinį nepasitikėjimu grįstą valdžios ir žmonių (...) santykį, o griežtas viešosios erdvės estetikos kanonas gali būti interpretuojamas kaip sovietmečio tradicijų tąsa bei režimo legitimumo įtvirtinimo priemonė. (shrink)

Tyrimų duomenys rodo, kad šiuolaikinė tranzicijos į suaugystę patirtis neatitinka so­cialinių normatyvinių tvarkaraščių, o suaugystės samprata prarado didelę savo vaid­menų struktūros ir tradicinės prasmės dalį, tapo daug labiau psichologiniu reiškiniu, siejamu su vėlyvosios modernios visuomenės individualizacija. Šiame straipsnyje analizuojamos suaugystės sampratų sąsajos su tranzicijos į suaugystę patirtimi Lietuvoje XXI a. Siekiama atsieti šias sąsajas formuojančius ar jų nebuvimą lemiančius veiksnius. Tam pasitelkta 1990­ųjų pradžioje gimusių dviejų skirtingų lyčių jaunuo­lių suaugystės atvejų analizė, paremta kokybine gyvenimo istorijų interviu medžiaga. Straipsnyje taip pat (...) pateikiamas platesnis ir bendresnis suaugystės modelių kaitos, pra­sidėjusios visuomenėms pereinant iš modernybės į vėlyvąją modernybę, vaizdas. Jis papildomas suaugystės kaitos XX–XXI a. Lietuvoje apžvalga. (shrink)

Straipsnyje, remiantis tarptautinio jaunimo delinkvencijos ir viktimizacijos kiekybinio tyrimo ISRD, kuris Lietuvoje atliktas 2006 m., 2013 m. ir 2022 m., duomenimis, nagrinėjamas jaunuolių, gimusių po 1990-ųjų metų Lietuvoje, turtinio ir smurtinio pobūdžio delinkventinis elgesys. Keliant klausimą, kaip keitėsi šio pobūdžio delinkventinio elgesio dinamika, kiek ji atliepė registruotų nepilnamečių nusikalstamų veikų tendencijas bei kiek lytis išliko kaip delinkventinį elgesį diferencijuojantis veiksnys, straipsnyje lyginamos trijų amžiaus kohortų, jaunuolių, gimusių 1991–1993 m., 1998–2000 m. ir 2007–2009 m., apklausų duomenys. Tyrimo rezultatai atskleidė delinkventinio elgesio (...) tarp kohortų skirtumus, o naujausio tyrimo rezultatai leidžia teigti, kad 2007–2009 m. gimusiųjų amžiaus kohortoje delinkventinis elgesys būdingas tiek vaikinams, tiek merginoms, ir šie jaunuoliai labiau pasižymi turtinio, o ne smurtinio pobūdžio delinkventiniu elgesiu. (shrink)

Trust is valuable when placed in trustworthy agents and activities, but damaging or costly when placed in untrustworthy agents and activities. So it is puzzling that much contemporary work on trust – such as that based on polling evidence – studies generic attitudes of trust in types of agent, institution or activity in complete abstraction from any account of trustworthiness. Information about others’ generic attitudes of trust or mistrust that take no account of evidence whether those attitudes are well or (...) ill placed can offer little or no help for those who aim to place or refuse trust well. Information about attitudes is evidently useful to those who aim to influence those who hold them, which explains why polls about attitudes are popular with political parties, advertisers and other campaigning organisations. But where we aim not to influence others, but to place and refuse trust intelligently we must link trust to trustworthiness, and must focus on evidence of honesty, competence and r... (shrink)

Knowledge aims to fit the world, and action to change it. In this collection of essays, Onora O'Neill explores the relationship between these concepts and shows that principles are not enough for ethical thought or action: we also need to understand how practical judgement identifies ways of enacting them and of changing the way things are. Both ethical and technical judgement are supported, she contends, by bringing to bear multiple considerations, ranging from ethical principles to real-world constraints, and while we (...) will never find practical algorithms - let alone ethical algorithms - that resolve moral and political issues, good practical judgement can bring abstract principles to bear in situations that call for action. Her essays thus challenge claims that all inquiry must use either the empirical methods of scientific inquiry or the interpretive methods of the humanities. They will appeal to a range of readers in moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

Shōwashi e no renketsu -- Higashi Ajia kara no me -- Tennō to iu jiba -- Watashi no kaikōki -- Jikokuhyō katate ni ekisoba o.

One of the most striking manifestations of schizophrenia is thought insertion. People suffering from this delusion believe they are not the author of thoughts which they nevertheless own as experiences. It seems that a person’s sense of agency and their sense of the boundary between mind and world can come apart. Schizophrenia thus vividly demonstrates that self awareness is a complex construction of the brain. This point is widely appreciated. What is not so widely appreciated is how radically schizophrenia challenges (...) our assumptions about the nature of the self. Most theorists endorse the traditional doctrine of the unity of consciousness, according to which a normal human brain generates a single consciousness at any instant in time. In this paper we argue that phenomenal consciousness at each instant is actually a multiplicity: an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. We then consider how certain aspects of self might emerge from this manifold substrate, and speculate about the origin of thought insertion. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was hailed by Claude Lévi-Strauss as the founder of the sciences of man. This collection of fourteen classic papers devoted to his work addresses the points of intersection between the moral and the political, the personal and the social. The volume is divided into five parts: The Critique of Progress and the Speculative Anthropology, The Naturalizing of Natural Law, The General Will and Totalitarianism, Anticipations of Game Theory and Strategies of Redemption. The articles are accompanied by an extensive, (...) detailed introduction by the editor along with a selective bibliography. (shrink)

First published in 1987. This study is an attempt to distinguish the problem of political obligation as it was formulated in the ancient world from the problem as it has presented itself in the modern world, and assesses the idealist achievement in the philosophical treatment of the problem of political obligation. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy and politics.

Biomedical diagnostic science is a great deal less successful than we've been willing to acknowledge in bioethics, and this fact has far-reaching ethical implications. In this article I consider the surprising prevalence of medically unexplained symptoms, and the term's ambiguous meaning. Then I frame central questions that remain answered in this context with respect to informed consent, autonomy, and truth-telling. Finally, I show that while considerable attention in this area is given to making sure not to provide biological care to (...) patients without a need, comparatively little is given to the competing, ethically central task of making sure never to obstruct access to biological care for those with diagnostically confusing biological conditions. I suggest this problem arises from confusion about the philosophical value of vagueness when it comes to the line between biological and psychosocial needs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE UNITY OF THE VICES JONATHAN JACOBS Oolgate University, Hamilton, New York JOHN ZEIS Oanisius Ooilege, Buffalo, New York W:E SOMETIMES describe someone 1rus "just plain,, ' ' • • 0 " ' ' • • mean, or Just plam d1shonesit, orr JUSt pJam unw." Or we say" thaJt wrus ·a just plain ·stupid thing rto do.," G~a:liizing from tlhese and lik!e descriiptions, we can ask, are there any (...) "just plain" vices? By this I mean, are :amy vices pure, 1e.g., can rthere he Cl'lllelty hut nort injustice or in!t:Jempertance, intemperance hut no!t a £ailill'e orf pmctical wisdom, cowardice but not intemperance or injustice, and so on? Is therie perhaps a unity of the vices? Is each ;a col'l'IU!ption thrat involves the coITUpiting ctontriburtion of the othe'l'IS? If there is,a, run:iity of the vicies, then 1be:inig ra vicious individual is Il!Ort siinply 1a ma!bter o:f failing :across the dimensioill of one or rrunothe.r 1 Cihaa:iae1becisltic. ]t ms tan extensi,ve diaiilure, 1a unified (:if l[JIOrt toit.al) failure, even if it is most evident 1and preVialent in one or another •specific respecit. 'f1his iis not to isay thrut.theiie is just one vice,.any moil'!e 1than '!Jo.endorse the unity of it.he virtues is to reduce tth:em to Ollle. There.are many woes OOlld many virrbues, eaiCh respeotively h!ruving to do with dillemnt 1and variously!l'le1aibed crupacirties, motives, emotions, and tiiaiits. Yet, rut least with respect to the virtues a good caise can be mrude :that they.are unified, aind thrut ·AnisbotLe was oorrreot in concluding that practical wisdom :and viWtues of cha;riacter mum occur st quite 1 s1tably, even if '1llolt happily. In any case, we ail"e in 1 to:tal ag.rteemelllt with Geach when he 1sayis 1that ithaJt "If 1a man's ha1bit of sound moml judgme1J11t is virtiiafod anyiwhere, then :it is at risk eVierywhere; but not all dangel"s issue in disa1sit1e'f!s." 3 But 1thes1e dis1as!ters arie aV1eTted r.not because of,any moml str1ength of characil:er 1 th:ait the agent 1truly ihas bUJt heca:us1 e of a me11e inc1ilJJaition tues. 'Ilhe former may he very :firm ox srtable. Mo11eover the n:aituil'ally vi11tuous rindividual may giener1a1ly no1t he oornfused or.impeded maction by "b.ar:d easies" or nnvelty. Alt times he rmay, 1and lthien me may find his re1sourroes iinoompe1be!I1t O'I.' unoel 'l:Ja1in in 1bhreir direetives. Hut the main rpo:inlt of co111iCT'last is thait mo11al virtues 11eflieot 1a 1evel of 1agency wh1oh involves undersitanding 1and self-determin1ation engiaged 1 to t:hat undersltanding, 1a 1leviel tihJait tis 1ruhsen1t foom iinc1ination-grounded action. Na,tu11a1l vri:r1tues 1a1rie ll101t to he despised, 1 and 1aclts :thait fLorw 1f110m 1tJhem 1are not w:iithout moml Wiortlh. But, using the fangiuiage of Fr1a:nk£u:rt, mom1l virtues are oha1racter]s,tios thait refiecrt second order volitions.5 The aiotis: thait flow fil1om them •are not H11e reis:ult of ways one just hrupens to be. And the undeil'-,starnding involvred in moml vrntues makes mo'ral misdireotion 1 1es;s li1"ely. Again, mnswder suoh t.lrings rus mis1applied oomprussfon, or paiti:errce, whioh can involve u1mairness 1and imprudence. P1 errharpis it.is heoausie rbhe mo:rial V1mtueis rare unified that it is 1so hard to rbe 1good. They invo1vie a complex reperrto:We of judgmenits, d1sposi!tiorrs, and moti¥es. No one of them can he oomp1ete on its own, and wie c1an't oome to have 1 tJhem simply 1hy decis1on. One oan til.'y rbo he move coumgeous bU1t caill't ibring it rubout meriely hy init1emal eommanid. Self-imposrutiion in5 In " Freedom of the Will and 'The Concept of a Person," H. Frankfurt writes, "Someone has a desire of the second order when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires "secondorder volitions" or " volitions of the second order." Now it is having... (shrink)

Nemám v úmyslu předložit školsky umný referát o filosofování, o různých filosofických koncepcích a jejich argumentaci, nýbrž pokusím se otevřít otázky, které mě bytostně zaměstnávají. Moje torzovité a fragmentární podněty se budou týkat následujících otázek-problémů: 1. Ontická realita na našem vnímání nezávislého světa a gnoseologické meze ontologie. 2. Co je racionalita, jaké jsou její možnosti a meze? Lze racionalitu kotvit gnoseologicky či již ontologicky? Jaký je vztah mezi racionalitou, přirozeností a přírodou? Je iracionalita předchůdná racionalitě? 3. Lze z racionality odvodit (...) etické jednání? Je racionalita vázána na určitý kulturní kontext a diskurs, či je universálně lidská? 4. Nemožnost objektivity a nezbytnost úsilí o co nejvyšší možnou míru objektivity. 5. Na čem založit humanitu? A proč vůbec humanita? 6. Posléze načrtnu svoji thesi: Skutečnost‚ její poznání a její utváření jako proces komplexity a komplementarity komponent v korelacích v kontinuitě a v kontextech. (Těmito šesti K si z Vás nechci dělat slovíčkářskou srandu, ale je to to nejvážnější, oč mi jde a s co Vám chci sdělit.) 7. Skončím položením radikálního otazníku nad filosofií. (shrink)

Socialinio darbo teoretikai sutinka, kad Pierre’o Bourdieu sociologijos įtaka sociali­ niam darbui plečiasi ir gilėja. Kita vertus, kai kalbama apie socialinio darbo profesiją, tie patys teoretikai ignoruoja P. Bourdieu nuostatą nuo profesijos tyrimų pereiti prie profesinio lauko analizės. P. Bourdieu profesijos fenomeną laikė biurokratinės pri­ gimties konceptualizacija, kuri įtvirtina mokslinio mąstymo logikai prieštaraujančias heteronomijos apraiškas. Straipsnyje siekiama įgyvendinti P. Bourdieu reikalavimą ir, pritaikius jį socialiniam darbui, nuo socialinio darbo profesijos analizės pereiti prie socialinio darbo profesinio lauko tyrimų. Straipsnyje ieškome atsakymo (...) į klausimą, kaip keičiasi su socialiniu darbu siejamų veiklos formų arba praktikų traktavimas, kai socialinio darbo profesijos analizę keičia socialinio darbo lauko tyrimas. Palyginę trijų skirtingų šalių – JAV, Japonijos ir Lietuvos – socialinio darbo profesinės veiklos lau­ kus, priėjome prie išvados, kad profesinio lauko, kitaip nei profesijos, požiūris sudaro prielaidas įtraukti į socialinio darbo lauką tas socialinio įgalinimo praktikas, kurios, socialinio darbo profesijos požiūriu, lieka anapus biurokratinio socialinio darbo reg­ lamento. (shrink)

In 1942, replying to a criticism put to him by Langford, G. E. Moore confessed that he was unable to solve the paradox of analysis. But while conceding inability to solve the puzzle Moore offered the following suggestion, which he did not further develop: I think that, in order to explain the fact that, even if ‘To be a brother is the same thing as to be a male sibling’ is true, yet nevertheless this statement is not the same as (...) the statement ‘To be a brother is to be a brother’, one must suppose that both statements are in some sense about the expressions used as well as about the concept of being a brother. But in what sense they are about the expressions used I cannot see clearly; and therefore I cannot give any clear solution to the puzzle. (shrink)

Quons are particles characterized by the parameter q, which permits smooth interpolation between Bose and Fermi statistics; q = 1 gives bosons, q = -1 gives fermions. In this paper we give a heuristic argument for an extension of conservation of statistics to quons with trilinear couplings of the form ffb, where f is fermion-like and b is boson-like. We show that q f 2 = qb. In particular, we relate the bound on qγ for photons to the bound on (...) qe for electrons, allowing the very precise bound for electrons to be carried over to photons. An extension of this argument suggests that all particles are fermions or bosons to a high precision. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a recent paper Alan Carter argues that the claim that workers’co‐operatives merely replace exploitation by employers with ‘self‐exploitation’is nonsense: the term ‘self‐exploitation’is self‐contradictory. He maintains that the only form of exploitation to which a workers’co‐operative may be said to be subject is ‘market‐exploitation’by dominant economic actors who are external to the co‐operative. I argue that these conclusions are mistaken. While the concept of ‘market‐exploitation’is not without value, it is difficult to operationalise. While the concept of ‘self‐exploitation’is, understood literally, (...) incoherent, the claims defended by some of the users of this term can be made conceptually respectable. (shrink)

The contents of the sixth book of Ennius' Annals have recently become a matter of dispute. Ever since Columna's edition it had been assumed that the book was entirely given over to the story of the war against king Pyrrhus . That view was based on the anecdote told by Quintilian 6.3.6, that Cicero, asked to say something de Sexto Annali, a witness in a law case, replied: ‘Quis potis ingentis oras euoluere belli’. It seems as good as certain that (...) this was the first line of Book VI, and belli was taken by all as referring to the Pyrrhus war. According to Dr T. Cornell, however, ‘unrolling the mighty scroll of war’ means that the poet is now going to describe warfare on the grand scale, thus setting the sequence of the third Samnite War, the Pyrrhus War, and the second Punic War against the minor wars described in the first five books. I doubt if Ennius would have felt that the early Latin war with the story of Lake Regillus, the capture of Veii, the Allia, the fall of Rome to the Gauls, and the second Samnite war were minor wars; but I am certain that bellum in the singular, except in contrast to the notion of pax, cannot refer to war in a general sense, covering a plurality of wars. (shrink)

This paper focuses on 3 features of Freyenhagen's Aristotelian version of Adorno. (a) It challenges the strict negativism Freyenhagen finds in Adorno. If we have morally relevant interests in ourselves, it is implicit that we have a standard by which to understand what is both good and bad for us (our interests). Because strict negativism operates without reference to what is good, it seems to be detached from real interests too. Torture, it is argued, is, among other things, a violation (...) of those interests. (b) Freyenhagen identifies the “impulse” in Adorno as an untutored yet moral reaction to morally demanding situations. The plausibility of this primitivism and its compatibility with Adorno's general worries about immediacy are considered. (c) The disruptive character of Adorno's version of the categorical imperative, its willingness to complicate action through wholesale reflection on the norms of what we are committing ourselves to, is set in contrast with Freyenhagen's Aristotelian claim that certain notions, such as “humanity,” cannot be intelligibly questioned. (shrink)